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ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the requirements for patentability as applied to biotechnology and pharmaceutical
inventions. Focusing on case law from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, as well as guidelines issued
by the United States Patent and Trademark Oﬃce, the Paper describes the requirements of utility, novelty,
nonobviousness, written description, and enablement. The Paper then goes on to summarize literature on
the economics of patents and the structure of the biotechnology industry. The Paper argues that strong
patent protection is vital in order to ensure innovation in the biotechnology industry. Finally, the Paper
addresses issues in patenting recent developments in biotechnology.
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I.
Introduction
Between the years 2000-2003, over a quarter of all new drugs approved were biotechnology drugs or bio-
pharmaceuticals.1 Over 60 products in the United States and European Union were approved during these
three years, as compared to 84 biopharmaceuticals approved prior to the year 2000.2 The biopharmaceutical
business has translated into big proﬁts and economic opportunity for drug companies: the annual global
market for biopharmaceuticals is estimated to be more than $30 billion.3
Despite the great potential in the area of biopharmaceuticals, compared to the billions of dollars that phar-
maceutical companies have been investing in research and development in recent years, the output in terms
of new drug products has been minimal. While the large pharmaceutical companies have undergone a wave
of mergers in recent years, the answer instead may be to turn to smaller biotechnology ﬁrms.4 These ﬁrms
can play an invaluable role in early drug discovery. Larger pharmaceutical companies can then play a role
1Gene Walsh, Biopharmaceutical Benchmarks—2003, 21 Nature Biotechnology 865 (2003).
2Id.
3Id.
4Bigger Isn’t Always Better, 418 Nature 353 (2002).
4in later development of commercial products and drug marketing.5
Patents on early research are often the most valuable assets owned by small biotechnology ﬁrms, allowing
these ﬁrms to obtain ﬁnancing and attract venture capital. At the same time, recent advances in the ﬁeld of
biotechnology have challenged the application of traditional patent law doctrines. It is of vital importance
that new developments in patent law address scientiﬁc advances in a way that promotes incentives for inno-
vation in the ﬁeld of biotechnology.
II.
5Id.
5Basic Overview of the Science
Biopharmaceuticals are drugs that are produced through genetic engineering, as opposed to traditional
chemically-synthesized drugs. Biopharmaceuticals can be grouped into ﬁve basic categories: 1) recombinant
proteins; 2) monoclonal antibody-based therapeutics; 3) antisense-based treatments; 4) gene therapy; and
5) tissue-engineering products.6
Genetic engineering methods take advantage of the relationship between the DNA sequence of a given gene
and its corresponding protein or RNA molecule. Once the function of a DNA sequence is known, modern
recombinant techniques allow scientists to manipulate the DNA sequence in vitro, and eventually to produce
altered recombinant human proteins that can be used to treat speciﬁc diseases. Monoclonal antibody-based
treatments can be produced in at least two ways. One common method is through hybridoma technology,
which uses a cloned cell line to produce a single type of antibody;7 a second method uses recombinant
DNA technology. Antisense-based treatments aim to use small, synthetic oligonucleotides8 to inhibit gene
expression—and thus the production of a protein.9 Gene therapy-based drugs attempt to change the expres-
sion of an individual’s genes, by delivering a normal copy of a missing or defective gene, or by delivering a
gene that will provide a special form of protection.10 Finally, tissue engineering treatments include products
such as injectable tissue matrices or substitute skin grafts.
The ﬁelds of genomics and proteomics will help to identify new targets for biotechnology drug therapy. While
a comprehensive sequence of the human genome was completed in the spring of 2003, the functions of many
6See Walsh, supra note 1.
7See Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., Nos. 03-1158, 03-1159, 2004 WL 612854 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 30, 2004).
8Oligonucleotides are short polymers of 2-20 nucleic acids.
9Only one antisense product has been approved for market sale, “although a recent surge of interest in RNAi could fuel
activity in this area.” Walsh, supra note 1, at 866.
10American Medical Association, Gene Therapy, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/ category/2827.html. No
gene therapy product has been approved for market sale to-date. See Walsh, supra note 1, at 866. While the traditional
approach to gene therapy was plagued by dose and delivery problems, a U.S. Patent No. 6,225,290 issued on May 3, 2001 for
a “gene pill” which claims to overcome these problems with a new method of delivering genes to intestinal cells. See Debra
Robertson, Gene Pill Patents a Surprise for Gene Therapy, 19 Nature Biotechnology 604 (2001).
6human genes remain undetermined.11 There are an estimated 30,000 to 35,000 protein-encoding genes in
an individual’s DNA,12 and there are much larger “non-coding” portions of the genome that are thought
to be functionally important.13 Thus, “[u]nderstanding, not ‘simply’ decoding, the operation, function, and
coordination of genome information will be the next transforming phase in biology.”14
Pharmacogenomics studies the interaction between genes and drug therapy and works toward understanding
how individual genetic variation aﬀects drug action.15 One particularly promising prospect in pharmacoge-
nomics is the study of single-nucleotide polymorphisms (“SNPs”).16 An SNP is a “polymorphism caused by
the change of a single nucleotide. Most genetic variation between individual humans is believed to be due
to SNPs.”17 The SNP Consortium for Biomedical Research, made up of 10 pharmaceutical companies and
the Wellcome Trust, has discovered and characterized nearly 1.8 million SNPs to date.18 SNPs can alter the
way that proteins are made, but more frequently they are useful as markers to locate mutations in DNA and
speed up the development of drug treatments for disease.19
Proteomics refers to “various technologies used to analyze collections of proteins produced by diﬀerent cell
types at diﬀerent stages in development and the cell cycle.”20 By analyzing what proteins are present in
diseased and healthy tissue samples, scientists are working to identify proteins that cause disease or that can
be targeted in disease treatment.21 While it used to take scientists years to ﬁngerprint a protein fragment,
11Francis S. Collins, et. al., A Vision for the Future of Genomics Research, 422 Nature 835 (2003) (discussing the landmark
completion of the Human Genome Project).
12Human Genome Project Information, Facts About Genome Sequencing, available at http://www.ornl.gov/
sci/techresources/Human Genome/faq/seqfacts.shtml.
13See Collins, supra note 11.
14Marvin E. Frazier, et. al., Realizing the Potential of the Genome Revolution: The Genomes to Life Program, 300 Science
290 (2003).
15Cheedy Jaja, Foretelling Our Pharmacogenomic Future, 21 Nature Biotechnology 487 (2003).
16Jeanette J. McCarthy & Rolf Hilﬁker, The Use of Single-Nucleotide Polymorphism Maps in Pharmacogenomics, 18 Nature
Biotechnology 505 (2000).
17Peer Bork & Richard Copley, Genome Speak, 409 Nature 815 (2001).
18See the SNP Consortium LTD. Website at http://snp.cshl.org.
19The SNP Consortium LTD, Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms: An Introduction, available at
http://snp.cshl.org/about/introduction.shtmh.
20Robert A. Bohrer, Proteomics: The Next Phase in the Biotechnology Revolution and the Next Challenge for Biotechnology
Law, 22 Biotechnology L. Rep. 263 (2003).
21Robert F. Service, High-Speed Biologists Search for Gold in Proteins, 294 Science 2074 (2001).
7this can now be done in a matter of minutes with the use of complex supercomputers.22 A few years ago
proteomics was touted as being “biology’s biggest boom industry.”23 However, proteomics is much more
complex than genomics; there are somewhere between 200,000 and 2 million proteins that are constantly
changing throughout a person’s lifetime, and proteomics is “an attempt to capture the dynamics of a living
system.”24 Thus, progress in proteomics has been slower and more expensive than originally predicted.
III.
22Id. Researchers are able to translate a protein’s amino acid sequence into a DNA sequence and then search for this sequence
in computer databases for the gene. Id. Assuming that it is known what protein the gene encodes for, researchers are able to
identify the protein. Id.
23Id.
24Id at 2075 (quoting Ruedi Aebersold, co-founder of the Institute for Systems Biology in Seattle, Washington).
8Sources of Patent Law and Requirements for Patentability
The Constitution gives Congress the power to create laws to “promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Rights to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.”25 A patentee has the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, or oﬀering to sell
the patented invention.26 The term of a patent begins on the date of issuance and lasts up to 20 years from
the date on which the application was ﬁled.27 There are ﬁve basic requirements for issuance of a patent: 1)
utility, 2) novelty, 3) nonobviousness, 4) written description, and 5) enablement.
The landmark decision of Diamond v. Chakrabarty28 paved the way for an explosion in the number of
biotechnology patents granted during the past two decades. In Chakrabarty the Supreme Court determined
for the ﬁrst time that a live, human-made microorganism qualiﬁed as patentable subject matter.29 The
invention at issue consisted of genetically-engineered bacteria capable of breaking down components of crude
oil, a property possessed by no naturally occurring bacteria.30 Congress set forth the qualiﬁcations for
patentable subject matter in 35 U.S.C. §101, which states “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”31 Before Chakrabarty, it
was well established that “the laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas” were not patentable,32
but it was unclear whether a living organism could be considered a “manufacture” or a “composition of
25Art. I, §8, cl. 8.
2635 U.S.C. §154 (2002).
27Id.
28447 U.S. 303 (1980).
29Id.
30See id. at 305.
3135 U.S.C. §101 (2002) (emphasis mine).
32Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (“Thus, a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable
subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that E=mc2, nor could Newton have patented the law of
gravity. Such discoveries are “manifestations of ...nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none” (internal citations
omitted).
9matter” under §101. Many argued that notwithstanding human intervention through genetic engineering, a
living microorganism should be considered a product of nature and thus unpatentable under §101.33
Instead, the Court read §101 broadly, relying heavily on the legislative history which indicated Congress’s
intent to include as patentable subject matter “anything under the Sun that is made by man.”34 Find-
ing Chakrabarty’s invention not “a hitherto unknown natural phenomena, but...a nonnaturally occurring
manufacture or composition of matter—a product of human ingenuity ‘having a distinctive name, character
and use,”’35 the Court determined that the invention qualiﬁed as patentable subject matter under §101.
Although the Court’s decision may now seem a matter of course, Chakrabarty stretched the boundaries of
law at the time; the majority cast aside concerns that genetic research might be too risky a project to be
supported by the federal government, while at the same time admitting that they, as judges, were without
competence to evaluate many of the scientiﬁc and policy issues involved.36
The Chakrabarty decision highlights an important tension that courts often face in the area of patent law.
While courts are charged with implementing the delicate balance that Congress has struck between com-
peting economic and social interests, courts must also face the reality of rapid and unforeseen advances in
science and technology. In other words, in an area where the law is designed to deal with unanticipated
inventions, the most important of which “push back the frontiers of chemistry, physics and the like,”37 it
is simply implausible to except Congress to provide in advance for every situation. Judge Pauline Newman
has noted that “[t]he shaping of patent law is to an exceptional degree within the hands of the judiciary,
33See id. at 306.
34See id at 309 (citing S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952)).
35Id. at 309-310.
36Id. at 316:
It is argued that this Court should weigh these potential hazards in considering whether respondent’s invention is patentable
subject matter under §101...we are without competence to entertain these arguments—either to brush them aside as fantasies
generated by fear of the unknown or to act on them. The choice we are urged to make is a matter of high policy resolution
within the legislative process after the kind of investigation, examination, and study that legislative bodies can provide and
courts cannot.
37Id. at 316, quoting Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950) (J. Douglas concurring opinion.)
10for in patent cases a relatively simple statutory law is applied to an extraordinary complexity of factual
circumstances.”38
The role courts play in shaping patent law is of central importance because the inconsistent application
of patent law can lead to decreased incentives for innovation in those technologies which depend on legal
certainty in order to invest in new research and development.39 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(“Federal Circuit”) was established by Congress in 1982, in part, to address inconsistency among circuits
in the application of patent law (and the resulting forum shopping) and to provide economic incentives for
industry investment in research and development.40 The Federal Circuit is a national appellate court with
jurisdiction to hear a variety of cases including those that “arise under” patent law, in whole or in part.41
Not surprising given the history surrounding its creation, the Federal Circuit has been described by many
as “pro-patent,” and some statistical studies seem to bear this claim out.42 In a now-famous study, Dunner
et al. found that between the years 1982 and 1994 the Federal Circuit was signiﬁcantly more likely to aﬃrm
judgments in favor of patent owners than accused infringers in district court cases.43 After the creation of
38Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit: Judicial Stability or Judicial Activism?, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 683, 685 (1993).
39See Pauline Newman, Celebrating the Tenth Anniversary of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 14 Geo. Mason
U. L. Rev. 513, 515 (1992):
Although not all new technologies require the support of a patent in order to be economically viable, for those that do the
degree of legal certainty, as to patentability and enforceability, is a signiﬁcant factor in innovation decisions. And for those
technologies that may not require patent support to be viable, any enhanced economic prospect that is available from a patent
will favorably aﬀect the risk/return calculation, and thus will weigh on the side of allocating resources toward innovation.
40Id. See also Josh Lerner, Patent Policy Reform and Its Implications, NBER Reporter: Research Summary (Winter 2003)
(noting that before the creation of the Federal Circuit some appellate courts were more than twice as likely to uphold patent
claims than others).
41See Newman, supra note 39. The Federal Circuit also has appellate jurisdiction over: monetary claims against the govern-
ment; American Indian claims; disputes involving contracts with the federal government; Merit Systems Protection Board cases;
cases from the Court of Veterans Appeals; the Court of Federal Claims; the Court of International Trade; the International
Trade Commission; the Tax Court; and the Department of Agriculture; as well as cases dealing with the Economic Stabilization
Act; the Natural Gas Policy Act; the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act; and the Energy Policy and Conservation Act. See
id.
42See Lerner, supra note 40 (arguing that the Federal Circuit is staﬀed with judges who are sympathetic to the patent system
and that the court has signiﬁcantly broadened patent holder’s rights).
43Donald R. Dunner et al., A Statistical Look at the Federal Circuit’s Patent Decisions: 1982-1994, 5 Fed. Circuit B.J. 151
(1995).
11the Federal Circuit there was a dramatic increase in the number of applications for U.S. patents: there were
62,098 utility patent applications (originating in the United States) in the year 1980 as compared to 164,795
applications in the year 2000.44 The contribution of the Federal Circuit’s allegedly “pro-patent” policies to
this increase has been widely debated.45 At the very least, the Federal Circuit has developed a body of case
law that: 1) is closely watched by those in the biotechnology industry and 2) on a continuous basis clariﬁes
and reﬁnes the requirements for patentability set forth by Congress in the patent laws.
A.
Utility: 35 U.S.C. §101
A second requirement for patentability is utility, as set forth in 35 U.S.C. §101: “[w]hoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.”46 In addition, 35 U.S.C. §112 sets forth the requirement that:
The speciﬁcation shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process
of making and using it, in such clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the
art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected to make and use the same, and
shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.47
While the separate requirement of enablement will be discussed infra, the utility requirement is implicit in
§112 since one cannot be enabled to use an invention unless the invention has a utility.48
44U.S. Dept. of Commerce, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Number of Utility Patent Applications
Filed in the United States, By Country of Origin Calender Year 1965 to Present (2001).
45Samuel Kortum & Josh Lerner, Stronger Protection or Technological Revolution: What is Behind the Recent
Surge in Patenting? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6204, 1997) (ﬁnding economic data supports the
theory that the surge in U.S. patent applications was attributable to new ﬁrm formation and innovation in the high technology
sector, not to changes in legal policy). See also Lerner, supra note 40 (noting that simultaneous changes occurred in the
structure of the USPTO, with the agency “increasingly [deﬁning] its mission as serving patent applicants”).
4635 U.S.C. §101 (2002) (emphasis mine).
48See In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
12The policy behind the utility requirement is that “the basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution
and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the beneﬁt derived by the public from an invention with
substantial utility.”49 Thus, an invention that is inoperable, frivolous, fraudulent, or against public policy
would not be patentable for lack of utility.50 Indeed, a process or product is not “useful” within the meaning
of §101 merely because it is the subject of serious scientiﬁc investigation and its disclosure would help to
advance that serious scientiﬁc investigation.51
With respect to biotechnology inventions, the most important line of cases addressing the utility requirement
is that dealing with pharmaceutical inventions. In the context of pharmaceuticals, the Federal Circuit has
stated that “knowledge of the pharmaceutical activity of any compound is obviously beneﬁcial to the public”
and that “adequate proof of any such utility constitutes a showing of practical utility.”52 In addition, in
order to provide a suﬃciently speciﬁc utility, the patent applicant must disclose a particular disease against
which the claimed compounds are alleged to be eﬀective.53
The Federal Circuit has often considered the type of testing necessary to establish a practical utility for
a compound. The court has held that “the test results need not absolutely prove that the compound is
pharmacologically active. All that is required is that the tests be ‘reasonably indicative of the desired
[pharmacological] response.”’54 For example, in vitro test results,55 if presented with a known correlation
49Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (emphasis mine). The Court went on to state that “[u]nless and until a
process is reﬁned and developed to this point—where speciﬁc beneﬁt exists in currently available form—there is insuﬃcient
justiﬁcation for permitting an applicant to engross what may prove to be a broad ﬁeld.” Id at 534-535.
50U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Manuel of Patent Examining Procedure,
§706.03(a)(1) (2003).
51Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. at 533.
52Cross v. Iizuka, 753 F.2d 1040, 1046 (emphasis mine) (Fed. Cir. 1985) (quoting Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853 (CCPA
1980).
53See In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
54Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 856 (CCPA 1980).
The court continued, “In other words, there must be a suﬃcient correlation between the tests and an asserted pharmacological
activity so as to convince those skilled in the art, to a reasonable probability, that the novel compound will exhibit the asserted
pharmacological behavior.” Id.
55In vitro refers to tests performed outside a living organism.
13between the results and in vivo activity,56 may be suﬃcient to establish practical utility.57 The court has
also indicated that suﬃcient structural similarity between the compound at issue and another compound
known to possess a particular pharmacological activity will often be suﬃcient evidence of practical utility.58
The Federal Circuit does not interpret the utility requirement of §101 as requiring a rigorous correlation
between in vitro and in vivo activity59 because of the “ﬁrm conviction that one who has taught the public that
a compound exhibits some desirable pharmaceutical property in a standard experimental animal has made
a signiﬁcant and useful contribution to the art, even though it may eventually appear that the compound is
without value in the treatment in humans.”60 The same reasoning would explain why suﬃcient structural
similarity between two compounds will often support a ﬁnding of practical utility. In both situations, the
Federal Circuit has interpreted §101 as reﬂecting Congress’s desire to provide incentives to industry to
pursue pharmaceutical research and development.61 If the utility requirement were construed too narrowly
and companies were not able to procure patent protection based on in vitro testing or structural homology,
the costs of further research and development might simply be prohibitive.
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Oﬃce (“USPTO”) issued Utility Examination Guidelines (“Utility Guide-
lines”) in January 2001, which attempted to incorporate the Federal Circuit’s precedent and to strike a
56In vivo refers to tests performed within a living organism.
57See Fijukawa, 93 F.3d at 1564. See also Genentech v. Chiron, 220 F.2d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (ﬁnding that there was
suﬃcient evidence for the district court to ﬁnd that practical utility existed in the case of a recombinant human insulin-like
growth factor fusion protein).
58Cross v. Iizuka, 753 at 1048 (stating that “[t]his court, in Rey-Bellet and Kawai, has implied that a particular pharmaco-
logical activity identiﬁed with prior art compounds may have probative value as to the fact that the compound of the count
possesses this particular pharmacological activity where there is a structural similarity between the prior art compounds and
the compound of the count. Rey-Bellet, 493 F.2d at 1385-87; Kawai 480 F.2d at 890-91.”
59Cross v. Iizuka, 753 at 1050.
60In re Brana, 51 F.3d at 1567. The court went on to state:
[u]sefulness in patent law, and in particular in the context of pharmaceutical inventions, necessarily includes the expectation
of further research and development. The stage at which an invention in this ﬁeld becomes useful is well before it is ready to be
administered to humans. Were we to require Phase II testing in order to prove utility, the associated costs would prevent many
companies from obtaining patent protection on promising new inventions, thereby eliminating an incentive to pursue, through
research and development, potential cures in many crucial areas such as the treatment of cancer.
Id. at 1568.
61See supra note 60.
14compromise between two competing concerns expressed by the public.62 On the one hand, members of the
biotechnology industry were concerned that “an overly restrictive utility requirement [would chill] investment
in the early stages of a company’s life, by withholding the promise of exclusivity associated with a patent
for too long.”63 On the other hand, several organizations, such as the American Society of Human Genetics
and the Human Genome Organization, were concerned that an overly broad utility requirement for genetic
patents would actually stiﬂe innovation.64
The Utility Guidelines make clear that in order to survive a rejection for lack of utility, an invention must
have a utility that is (1) speciﬁc, (2) substantial, and (3) credible.65 First, a speciﬁc utility is a utility that
would not be applicable to the broad class of the invention.66 For example, one could not claim a polynu-
cleotide to be used as a “gene probe” without disclosing a speciﬁc DNA target.67 Second, an invention with
substantial utility has practical use without requiring further research or experimentation.68 In order for the
gene probe in the above example to have a substantial utility, the DNA target itself must have a utility that
is speciﬁc, substantial, and credible.69 Finally, credible utility is a utility that is “believable to a person of
ordinary skill in the art based on the totality of evidence and reasoning provided.”70
When the USPTO was originally considering revising the Utility Guidelines, sharp criticism was lodged by
62Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan 5, 2001).
63Robert P. Merges, Patent Law and Policy: Cases and Materials at 205-06 (2d ed. 1997).
64See Lawrence T. Kass & Michael N. Nitbach, A Roadmap for Biotechnology Patents? Federal Circuit Precedent and the
PTO’s New Examination Guidelines, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 233 (2002). Noting “[i]n general, there has been support for criteria that
would prevent the patenting of broad claims based upon partial DNA sequences and, in particular, those partial sequences for
which no speciﬁc biological utility has been demonstrated.” Id. at 244.
65Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan 5, 2001). The Guidelines “do not constitute substantive rulemaking
and hence do not have the force and eﬀect of law.” Id. at 1098.
66U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Patent and Trademark Oﬃce, Revised Interim Utility Guidelines Training Materials
5-6, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/oﬃces/pac/utility/utilityguide.pdf.
67Id.
68Id. at 6-7.
69Id.
70Id. at 5. Note that “[c]redibility is assessed from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art in view of the disclosure
and any other evidence of record (e.g., test data, aﬃdavits, declarations from experts in the art, patents or printed publications)
that is probative of the applicant’s assertions.” Utility Examination Guidelines, supra note 65, at 1098.
15many within the scientiﬁc community who argued that ﬁnding sequence homology required little scientiﬁc
insight or invention.71 Many expressed concern that once a patent is granted based solely on homology, “the
patent holder will have little incentive to continue to a full characterization of the gene product –but could
claim the rights to the results of other researchers who later did this.”72 Similarly, Jack Spiegel, Director of
the NIH’s Division of Technology Transfer and Development noted that “[m]inor changes in the nucleotide
or amino acid sequences of...molecules may produce profound changes in biological activity...homology in
an unpredictable art cannot, by itself, provide a speciﬁc utility.”73 However, despite the concerns initially
expressed, the USPTO and the Federal Circuit have made clear that the utility requirement can be met
based on in vitro test results or DNA sequence homology.
B.
Novelty and Anticipation: 35 U.S.C. §102
A third requirement for patentability is novelty, as set forth in pertinent part, in 35 U.S.C. §102(a): a
person shall be entitled to a patent unless “the invention was known or used by others in this country,
or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof
by the applicant for the patent.”74 The novelty requirement has often been called “technical” because a
product or process is not considered to be anticipated under §102 unless all of the elements of the claimed
invention are disclosed in a single prior art reference.75 The Federal Circuit has formulated the novelty test
71Paul Smaglik, NIH Opposed Plans for Patenting ‘Similar’ Gene Sequences, 405 Nature 2 (2000).
72Id.
73Id.
7435 U.S.C. §102(a) (2002).
75Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert P. Merges, Opinion Letter as to the Patentability of Certain Inventions Associated with
the Identiﬁcation of Partial cDNA Sequences, 23 AIPLA Q. J. 1, 20-21 (1995) (stating “[t]hus patent lawyers who have the
relevant prior art references before them may often avoid novelty rejections by tinkering with the claim language to avoid
covering subject matter that has been disclosed in the prior art.”)
16as follows: “[a]n ‘anticipating’ reference must describe all of the elements and limitations of the claim in a
single reference, and enable one of skill in the ﬁeld of the invention to make and use the claimed invention.”76
When a patent claim covers several diﬀerent structures or compounds, the claim is considered anticipated
if any one of the compounds is present in the prior art.77 In addition, in order for a prior art reference to
anticipate a claim, the reference must enable one of skill in the art to make and use the invention.78
It has long been established that there is some ﬂexibility in the test of novelty; a prior art reference can
anticipate a patent claim “without disclosing a feature of the claimed invention if that missing characteristic
is necessarily present, or inherent, in the single anticipating reference.”79 In a recent and controversial case,
Schering Corporation v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Federal Circuit arguably expanded this ﬂexibility
by holding that “this court sees no reason to modify the general rule for inherent anticipation in a case where
inherency supplies the entire anticipatory subject matter.”80
The subject matter at issue in Schering, was a compound known as DCL, a metabolite81 of loratadine that
operates as a non-drowsy antihistamine.82 The prior art disclosed the structure of loratadine and its use as
a non-drowsy antihistamine, however it did not disclose DCL or refer to metabolites of loratadine.83 The
court found that the claims of the prior art patent inherently disclosed DCL, because “a patient ingesting
loratadine would necessarily metabolize the compound to DCL.”84
76Merck v. Teva Pharmaceuticals, 347 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
77See Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
78Elan Pharm., Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. and Research, 346 F.3d 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2003). For discussion of
requirements for enablement, see infra.
79Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Continental Can Co. v. Monsanto
Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
80Id. at 1379.
81A metabolite is “a compound formed in the patient’s body upon ingestion of a pharmaceutical.” Id. at 1375.
82See id.
83See id.
84See id. at 1380. The court later stated:
A skilled patent drafter, however, might fashion a claim to cover the metabolite in a way that avoids anticipation. For
example, the metabolite may be claimed in its pure and isolated form...or as a pharmaceutical composition (e.g., with a
17Prior to Schering, the doctrine of inherent anticipation was used to invalidate a claim when the relevant prior
art was missing a feature of the claimed invention, but the missing feature was a “natural result ﬂowing from
the reference’s explicitly explicated limitations.”85 However, in Schering the court found the subject matter
of the claims anticipated even though no part of the structure of DCL was explicitly disclosed in the prior
art. The court found that the entire structure of DCL was inherent in the prior art, and was thus placed
within the public domain. The court also reaﬃrmed that inherent anticipation does not require recognition
in the prior art—thus a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time need not have been able to recognize
the inherent disclosure.86
The Federal Circuit denied petitions for a panel and an en banc rehearing of the Schering case. In a heated
dissent to the denial of rehearing, Judge Pauline Newman found that the court “reached the correct result of
no liability for infringement, but for the wrong reason.”87 Judge Newman explained that “the panel strains
to hold that this newly discovered, previously unknown product cannot be validly patented” under §102.88
Judge Newman expressed concern that the panel’s new rule may have “particular impact on the discovery
of biological products.”89 For example, in any patentable biological organism there will necessarily be many
products that are inherent, but which might not be “discovered” until a much later date.90 The general rule
of patent law has always been that a “previously unknown product does not become unpatentable simply
because it existed before it was discovered.”91 Judge Newman explained that the crucial move made by the
court in Schering was to determine that the missing element in the prior art need not have been known to
pharmaceutically acceptable carrier). The patent drafter could also claim a method of administering the metabolite or the
corresponding pharmaceutical composition. The [prior art patent] would not provide an enabling disclosure to anticipate such
claims because, for instance, the [prior art patent] does not disclose isolation of DCL.
Id. at 1381.
85Eli Lilly and Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
86See Schering Corp. v. Geneva, 339 F.3d 1337.
87Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 348 F.3d 992, 994 (Fed Cir. 2003) (denial of rehearing). Judge Newman explained
that a ﬁnding of non-infringement was appropriate because the defendants were only practicing the technology of the expired
loratadine patent. Id.
88Id.
89Id.
90Id.
91Id.
18be present by a person of ordinary skill in the art. In the Schering case, Judge Newman noted that there
was no evidence that a “person of ordinary skill would have known that DCL is formed in vivo upon the
ingestion of loratadine.”92
Judge Lourie also dissented from the denial of rehearing in Schering. Judge Lourie noted that a phar-
maceutical product patent typically issues before “clinical trials on the product have revealed the identity
or nature of any metabolites, ” and the court’s holding in Schering mandates that “the mere issuance of
the patent on the product—or any other publication of that product—inherently anticipates claims to the
metabolite merely by disclosing that the product can be administered to a patient, on the theory that such
administration would inevitably cause the human body to ‘make’ the metabolite.”93
C.
Nonobviousness: 35 U.S.C. §103
A fourth requirement for patentability is nonobviousness, as set forth in 35 U.S.C. §103:
A patent may not be obtained...if the diﬀerences between the subject matter sought to be patented
and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time
the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the said subject matter
pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.94
The obviousness determination is a question of law which depends in part on the factual inquiries set out
by the Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co.,: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the
diﬀerences between the claims and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and (4)
secondary considerations, if any, of nonobviousness.95 Since “[t]he genius of invention is often a combination
92Id. at 995.
93Id. at 995.
95383 U.S. 1 (1965). The phrase ‘secondary considerations’ refers to “evidence outside the intrinsic features of the inven-
tion...the real-world circumstances surrounding its origin and commercialization.” Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and
19of known elements which in hindsight seems preordained,”96 the Federal Circuit has stated further that
a showing of obviousness requires “a motivation or suggestion to combine or modify prior art references,
coupled with a reasonable expectation of success.”97
The requirement of a reasonable expectation of success is especially important in the area of biotechnology,
a relatively unpredictable art.98 In the closely related area of chemical compounds, the Federal Circuit has
held that a prima facie case of obviousness is established where there is “structural similarity” between the
claimed and prior art subject matter and where the prior art gives “reason or motivation to make the claimed
compositions.”99 In the area of biotechnology, the chemical structure at issue will often be the structure of
a DNA, cDNA, or RNA molecule. While prior art will often not disclose the structure of any relevant DNA
molecules, for example, it will often disclose the structure of the protein encoded by the DNA molecule at
issue.
Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 803 (1988). Secondary or objective considerations
include: commercial success of the invention, the extent of licensing, immediate copying by competitors, failure of others to
make the same invention, and long-felt need for the invention. Id. at 817. Another especially important secondary or objective
consideration is the presence of “unexpected results.” See Richardson-Vicks Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 122 F.3d 1476 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (stating that evidence of unexpected results must be considered in evaluating the obviousness of a claimed invention).
Note that objective evidence “such as commercial success, failure of others, long-felt need, and unexpected results must be
considered before a conclusion on obviousness is reached and is not merely ‘icing on the cake.”’ Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal
Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
96McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
97Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In addition, both “the
suggestion and the reasonable expectation of success must be found in the prior art, and not in the applicant’s disclosure.” In
re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 493 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The case law has made clear that just because something is “obvious to try”
this does not necessarily mean that the claimed subject matter is obvious under §103. In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir.
1988). An invention is “obvious to try” where “the prior art gives either no indication of which parameters are critical or no
direction as to which of many possible choices is likely to be successful. Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 807 (Fed.
Cir. 1989). It has also been stated that “[a]n ‘obvious to try’ situation exists when a general disclosure may pique the scientist’s
curiosity, such that further investigation might be done as a result of the disclosure, but the disclosure itself does not contain
a suﬃcient teaching of how to obtain the desired result, or that the claimed result would be obtained if certain directions were
pursued.” In re Eli Lilly & Co., 902 F.2d 943, 945 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
98Eli Lilly & Co., 902 F.2d at 948 (stating that “[a]lthough we recognize and give weight to the unpredictability of biological
properties, in Raun’s case the prior art teaches the claimed use with speciﬁcity”).
99In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 692 (Fed. Cir. 1990). See also Yamanouchi Pharm. Co., v. Danbury Pharm. Inc., 231 F.3d
1339 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that “a prior art compound may suggest its
homologs because homologs often have similar properties and therefore chemists of ordinary skill would ordinarily contemplate
making them to try to obtain compounds with improved properties”).
20In In re Bell, the Federal Circuit rejected the proposition that “just as closely related homologs, analogs,
and isomers in chemistry may create a prima facie case [of obviousness]...the established relationship in the
genetic code between a nucleic acid and the protein it encodes also makes a gene prima facie obvious over
its correspondent protein.”100 The court acknowledged that once the structure of a protein is known, it is
possible to hypothesize structures of the gene encoding for that protein.101 However, the court concluded
that “because of the degeneracy of the genetic code, there are a vast number of nucleotide sequences that
might code for a speciﬁc protein.”102 Thus, unless the prior art suggested that a particular genetic sequence
would be more likely than others to encode the protein disclosed in the prior art, subject matter relating to
the structure of the corresponding gene would not be rendered obvious.103
Similarly, in In re Deuel, the Federal Circuit held that when the prior art did not disclose any relevant cDNA
molecules,104 the mere disclosure of corresponding proteins and the general idea, function, and chemical
nature of the claimed cDNA molecules was not enough to render the subject matter obvious.105 The court
found that the “redundancy of the genetic code precluded contemplation of or focus on the speciﬁc cDNA
molecules of [the claims],” and thus “any motivation that existed was a general one, to try to obtain a gene
that was yet undeﬁned and may have constituted many forms.”106
The Federal Circuit’s obviousness jurisprudence has been criticized as being based on the assumption that
“biotechnology is as much a black art as a science, where the result of experimentation is largely out of
100In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 783-784 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
101Id.
102Id.
103Id.
104A cDNA molecule has a sequence that it complementary to the mRNA corresponding to a particular protein. Thus the
cDNA sequence is the same as the naturally occurring DNA sequence that encodes the protein.
105In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
106Id. at 1558. However, the court did note that a “diﬀerent result might pertain...if there were prior art, e.g., a protein of
suﬃciently small size and simplicity, so that lacking redundancy, each possible DNA would be obvious over the protein.” Id.
at 1559.
21the skilled artisan’s hands.”107 Burk & Lemley have argued that instead of carving out a special law for
obviousness and written description in biotechnology cases, the court should focus on the level of skill in the
art:
All of these holdings are based on the assumption that one ordinarily skilled in biotechnology cannot
move conceptually from a protein to a DNA sequence, or from the DNA sequence of one organism to
the corresponding DNA sequence of another organism. Arguably this understanding of the science
of biotechnology is simply wrong...Such research is properly compared to searching a “black box” in
which are contained molecules of known characteristics, if unknown structure; the search is conducted
based on what is known—the function—rather than on the basis of what is unknown—the precise
structure. The function of the molecule that will be found is predictable, as is the likelihood of
ﬁnding such a molecule, even if the precise structure of the molecule cannot be predicted.108
Since the obviousness and enablement standards are inversely related, the court’s assumptions about unpre-
dictability in the ﬁeld of biotechnology have made it easier for patent applicants to meet the obviousness
requirement but more diﬃcult for applicants to meet the written description and enablement requirements.109
The end result is the issuance of numerous narrow patents on genes and DNA sequences.110
D. Written Description, Enablement, and Best Mode: 35 U.S.C. §112
Two ﬁnal requirements for patentability are written description and enablement, as set forth in 35 U.S.C.
§112, ¶ 1:
The speciﬁcation shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process
of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled
in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same,
and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.111
107Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Speciﬁc?, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1155, 1193 (2002).
109Id. at 1181.
110Id. at 1193.
22The written description requirement serves a “signaling function,” allowing others to read the patent and
“understand with a substantial degree of certainty where the patentee’s proprietary boundaries lie.”112
The basic policy rationale behind the two requirements is that in exchange for a period of exclusivity, the
patentee must provide the public with enough information about the bounds of the invention and how to
use the invention so that others can improve and build upon the invention—thus leading to further advances
in the science.113
It should be noted that 35 U.S.C. §112 also requires that the speciﬁcation set forth the “best mode” of
the invention. This analysis has been interpreted as having two components: ﬁrst, whether the inventor
contemplated a best mode of practicing his invention, and second, whether he concealed that best mode
from the public.114
1.
Written Description
The legal test for the written description requirement ensures that “the inventor had possession, as of the
ﬁling date of the application relied on, of the speciﬁc subject matter later claimed by him.”115 The disclosure
must “clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the applicant] invented what is
112Donald S. Chisum Et Al., Principles of Patent Law: Cases and Materials 211-212 (2d ed. 2001). §112, ¶ also
contains a requirement of deﬁniteness. This requirement has been interpreted as requiring that the “claims, read in light of the
speciﬁcation, reasonably apprise those skilled in the art both of the utilization and scope of the invention” and the language
must be “as precise as the subject matter permits.” Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1385 (Fed.
Cir. 1986).
113Chisum, supra note 112, at 162.
114Amgen, Inc., v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The court went on the state that the best mode
requirement is “a safeguard against the possible selﬁsh desire on the part of some people to obtain patent protection without
making a full disclosure. The requirement does not permit an inventor to disclose only what is known to be the second-best
embodiment, retaining the best.” Id. at 1211.
115In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257 (CCPA 1976).
23claimed.”116 The question of whether a written description is adequate is a question of fact, that will
“necessarily vary depending on the nature of the invention claimed.”117
The Federal Circuit has held generally that in a case where DNA or other nucleic acid is the subject matter
of the claim, an adequate written description requires “a precise deﬁnition, such as by structure, formula,
chemical name, or physical properties.”118 In the important case of The Reagents of the University of
California v. Eli Lilly & Co., the Federal Circuit reaﬃrmed this principle. In Eli Lilly, the patent at issue
covered recombinant plasmids and microorganisms that produce human insulin.119 Although the written
description did not provide the nucleotide sequence of the human insulin-encoding gene, it did describe
a method of obtaining the DNA sequence as well as the amino acid sequences of human insulin A and B
chains.120 The applicant also disclosed the rat proinsulin cDNA sequence.121 However, relying on its decision
in In re Deuel (ﬁnding that a claim to a speciﬁc DNA is not made obvious by knowledge of the protein
sequence and methods for generating the DNA that encodes that protein), the court found the written
description inadequate.122 The court stated that a “description that does not render a claimed invention
obvious does not suﬃciently describe that invention for purposes of §112, ¶1.”123 Notably, the court also
went on to ﬁnd claims to a broad class of vertebrate or mammalian insulin cDNA invalid, because they were
based on a mere description of rat insulin cDNA.124 Only by describing a representative number of cDNA’s
within the genus (by disclosing their sequence) or by describing structural features common to the members
116In re Alton, 76 F.3d 1168, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
117Enzo Biochem v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 296 F.3d 1316, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
118Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed Cir. 1992).
119Id.
120Id.
121Id.
122Id. The court went on to note that “a cDNA is not deﬁned or described by the mere name ‘cDNA,’ even if accompanied
by the name of the protein that it encodes, but requires a kind of speciﬁcity usually achieved by means of the recitation of the
sequence of nucleotides that make up the DNA.” Id.
123119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
124Id.
24of the genus, could the University of California have provided adequate written description.125
However, in Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., the Federal Circuit made clear that not all functional
descriptions of genetic material fail to meet the written description requirement.126 The court suggested
that claimed nucleotide sequences may be adequately described by their ability to hybridize to a substrate
identiﬁed in the speciﬁcation.127 The patent at issue related to nucleic acid probes that selectively hybridize
to genetic material of the bacteria that cause N. gonorrhoeae, thus making the bacteria detectable.128
Although the applicant did not disclose the full sequences of the nucleic acid probes, the applicant described
the binding aﬃnity of the sequences and made the sequences available at a public depository.129 The court
was “persuaded” that this description of binding aﬃnity could be suﬃcient to meet the written description
if it was coupled with 1) “a disclosed correlation between that function and a structure that is suﬃciently
known or disclosed;” and 2) a reference in the speciﬁcation to the nucleotide sequence available in a public
depository.130 While the court made clear that the sequences themselves were adequately described, the
court remanded the district court the determination as to whether claims to mutated variations of the
deposited sequences, still within the hybridization ratio, were adequately described.131 In addition, some of
the claims covered a broad genus of nucleic acids. With respect to the issue of whether the disclosed species
of nucleic acids were representative of the genus—either based on the functional description or the deposits
of material—the court determined that this was an issue of fact that needed to be determined on remand.132
In Enzo Biochem, the court cited with approval Guidelines for the Examination of Patent Applications Under
the 35 U.S.C. 112, ¶ 1, “Written Description” Requirement (“Written Description Guidelines”) which were
125Id.
126323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
127Id.
128Id. at 1320-21.
129Id.
130Id. at 1325.
131Id. at 1326-27
132Id. at 1327.
25issued by the USPTO in January 2001.133 The Written Description Guidelines explain how in certain cases
an applicant may meet the written description requirement by disclosing merely the function, as opposed to
the structure, of a genetic material:
An applicant may also show that an invention is complete by disclosure of suﬃciently detailed,
relevant identifying characteristics which provide evidence that applicant was in possession of the
claimed invention, i.e., complete or partial structure, other physical and/or chemical properties,
functional characteristics when coupled with a known or disclosed correlation between function and
structure, or some combination of such characteristics.134
The training materials based on the Written Description Guidelines provide as an example an isolated nucleic
acid that speciﬁcally hybridizes under highly stringent conditions to a known DNA sequence that encodes
a protein with a speciﬁc function.135 Although only a single species within the scope of the claimed genus
is disclosed, the materials ﬁnd the claimed invention to be adequately described.136 This determination is
based on the fact that a person of skill in the art would not expect substantial variation among species within
the claimed genus due to the “highly stringent” hybridization conditions which would limit the claims to
structurally similar DNA.137
In the case of Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., the Federal Circuit
made clear that inquiry into the adequacy of written description is highly fact-speciﬁc and dependent on the
level of skill in the art.138 The patents at issue were related to the production of erythropoietin (“EPO”),
133Guidelines for the Examination of Patent Applications Under the 35 U.S.C. 112, ¶ 1, “Written Description” Requirement,
66 Fed. Reg. 1099 (2001). The Written Description guidelines do not constitute substantive rulemaking and thus do not have
the force and eﬀect of law. Id. at 1104.
135U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Patent and Trademark Oﬃce, Synopsis of Application of Written Description Guide-
lines at 35-37, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/guides.htm.
136Id.
137Id.
138Amgen Inc., v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir 2003). Recently, in the case of Noelle v. Lederman,
the court noted that each case involving the issue of written description, “must be decided on its own facts. Thus precedential
value of cases in this area is extremely limited.” 355 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
26a naturally occurring hormone that controls the formation of red blood cells in bone marrow.139 Patent
claims were directed to recombinant techniques of introducing human DNA encoding EPO into Chinese
hamster ovary (“CHO”) cells and resulting in the production of EPO product with the capacity to cause
bone marrow cells to increase the production of red blood cells.140 Although the claims were directed to a
method of producing recombinant EPO in a broad class of vertebrate or mammalian cells, the speciﬁcation
only disclosed examples utilizing monkey cells.141 Despite this fact, the court aﬃrmed the district court’s
ﬁnding that the written description requirement had been met. In doing so, the court cited testimony
that there would be only “minor diﬀerences” in applying the method of the disclosed examples to any
vertebrate or mammalian cells, and that those of ordinary skill could “easily” ﬁgure out these diﬀerences in
methodology.142 Thus, the court found both “Eli Lilly and Enzo Biochem...inapposite to this case because
the claim terms at issue here are not new or unknown biological materials that ordinarily skilled artisans
would easily miscomprehend.”143 The court further found that the words “vertebrate” and “mammalian”
readily provide enough information for one of skill in the art to be able to recognize the members of the
genus.144
The recent case of Noelle v. Lederman involved patent claims relating to the CD40CR antibody that
represses the cell-to-cell signaling interaction between helper T-cells and B-cells, thus preventing the B-cell
from producing antibodies which can be helpful for treating overactive immune system responses.145 The
applicant claimed mouse, human, and genus forms of the CD40CR and described their binding aﬃnity to
the CD40CR antigen. Yet the applicant failed to disclose any structural elements of the antibodies, and
139Id. at 1319.
140Id. at 1321-22.
141Id. at 1331.
142Id.
143Id. at 1332.
144Id.
145355 F.3d 1343, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Noelle v. Lederman actually concerned an interference proceeding, but the written
description requirement must be met in order for a patent to claim a priority ﬁling date. Id.
27disclosed structural elements of only the mouse CD40CR antigen.146 The Federal Circuit stated:
As long as an applicant has disclosed a “fully characterized antigen,” either by structure, formula,
chemical name, or physical properties, or by depositing the protein in a public depository, the
applicant can then claim an antibody by its binding aﬃnity to that described antigen.147
The court thus held the claims to the human and genus forms of the antibody invalid because the applicant
could not “deﬁne an unknown by its binding aﬃnity to an unknown.”148 The court determined that at the
time of patent application there was too much unpredictability in the structure of antibodies from species
other than the monkey to allow the applicant to claim the genus.
Another recent decision by the Federal Circuit on the written description requirement is University of
Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc.149 Researchers at the University of Rochester discovered that unlike
traditional anti-inﬂammatory treatments that inhibit prostaglandin synthesis catalyzed by both the PGHS-1
and PGHS-2 enzymes, a compound that inhibits only the PGHS-2 enzyme would have signiﬁcantly fewer
side eﬀects.150 The University of Rochester patent claimed a method of treatment using a compound that
selectively inhibits PGHS-2 activity and a method of screening for such compounds.151 Although the patent
claimed a wide variety of compounds useful for treatment, including peptides, antibodies, and small inorganic
compounds, the patent did not identify the compounds with any particularity by describing their structure
or physical properties.152 The court described the district court’s ﬁnding of the patent’s disclosure as follows:
146Id. at 1349.
148Id.
149358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
150See Anne Y. Brody, Rochester v. Searle: Complying with the Written Description and Enablement Requirements in
Early-Stage Drug Discovery, 22 Biotechnology L. Rep. 472 (2003).
151Searle, 358 F.3d at 918.
152See Brody, supra note 150, at 474.
28although all of the claims require the use of a “non-steroidal compound that selectively inhibits
activity of the pGHS-2 gene,” the [patent] neither discloses any such compound nor provides any
suggestion as to how such a compound could be made or otherwise obtained other than by trial-and-
error research. Indeed, the court found no evidence in the [patent] that the inventors themselves
knew of any such compound at the time their patent application was ﬁled.153
The court aﬃrmed the principle that “[a] description of what a material does, rather than of what it is,
usually does not suﬃce...The disclosure must allow one skilled in the art to visualize or recognize the identity
of the subject matter purportedly described.”154
The Searle case has particular signiﬁcance for the future of the drug industry. Before this case, it was
standard practice to use method of treatment patents with “reach-through” claims in order to secure proﬁts
from commercial products resulting down the line from the identiﬁcation of drug targets.155 The Federal
Circuit made clear that it will not allow a patent to issue too early in the research and development process
and that researchers engaging in fundamental research will be able to secure only limited proﬁts from later
commercialization of products based on their discoveries.
2.
Enablement
The legal test for enablement is whether there is “suﬃcient working procedure for one skilled in the art to
practice the claimed invention without undue experimentation.”156 Factors relevant to the determination of
whether the required experimentation is reasonable include: 1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, 2)
154Id. at 923 (citing Lilly and Enzo).
155See Brody, supra note 150 at 472.
156In re Stephens, 529 F.2d 1343, 1345 (CCPA 1976). See also Elan Pharm. v. Mayo Found. for Medical Education and
Research, 346 F.3d 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
29the amount of direction or guidance presented, 3) the presence or absence of working examples, 4) the nature
of the invention, 5) the state of the prior art, 6) the relative skill of those in the art, 7) the predictability
or unpredictability of the art, and 8) the breadth of the claims.157 Although based on a factual inquiry, the
determination of enablement is a legal one.158
In the context of biotechnology inventions that depend on the use of living materials, further steps may be
necessary in order to satisfy the enablement requirement. In some cases, simply reading a description of the
invention, if lacking the necessary starting materials, does not allow one to practice the invention. It is often
necessary for the microorganisms or cultured cells to be deposited in a cell depository which will then make
these samples available to the public.159 The Federal Circuit has held that “[e]ven when starting materials
are available, a deposit [is] necessary where it would require undue experimentation to make the cells of the
invention from the starting materials.”160
The Federal Circuit has applied a more stringent enablement standard in the relatively “unpredictable” area
of biotechnology. In the case of In re Vaeck, the Federal Circuit determined that “[w]here, as here, a claimed
genus represents a diverse and relatively poorly understood group of microorganisms, the required level of
disclosure will be greater than, for example, the disclosure of an invention involving a “predictable” factor
such as a mechanical or electrical element.”161 In the case of Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., the Fed-
eral Circuit similarly held that broad claims covering the practice of antisense technology in all prokaryotic
and eukaryotic cells, by only describing the technology in E. coli, were invalid.162
157In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
158Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S. 108 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
159Id. at 735. See also In re Lundak, 773 F.2d 1216, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating “[w]hen an invention relates to a new
biological material, the material may not be reproducible even when detailed procedures and a complete taxonomic description
are included in the speciﬁcation”).
160In re Wands, 858 F.2d at 735.
161947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991). In Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, where the patent concerned a cleavable
fusion expression process for producing human growth hormone, the Court stated “[w]hile every aspect of the generic claim
certainly need not have been carried out by an inventor, or exempliﬁed in the speciﬁcation, reasonable detail must be provided
in order to enable members of the public to understand and carry out the invention. 108 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
162188 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
303.
Recent Developments in Written Description and Enablement
In the case of Plant Genetic Systems, N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics, Corp., the Federal Circuit rejected the
contention that a “pioneer” patent was entitled to broad scope of coverage and a lower enablement stan-
dard.163 The patent claims at issue covered plants, plant cells, and seeds that were genetically engineered
to be herbicide-resistant (by producing a protein that prevents herbicides from blocking the function of glu-
tamine synthetase.)164 While the claims broadly covered any type of plant cell—which would include both
monocots165 and dicots166—the patent only disclosed working examples of how to transform dicots.167 At
the time the patent application was ﬁled, “monocots existed...and stably-transformed monocot cells were
highly desirable...But stably transformed monocot cells were diﬃcult to produce, and the [patent] gave no
instruction how.”168
The court reaﬃrmed that §112, ¶ requires that the scope of the claims bear a reasonable correlation to the
scope of the enablement provided by the speciﬁcation to persons of ordinary skill in the art.169 When making
this determination, enablement must be assessed as of the eﬀective ﬁling date of the patent.170 In Plant
Genetic Systems, the court distinguished the case of In re Hogan.171 In Hogan, the patent claims covered
163Plant Genetic Systems, N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
164Id. at 1337.
165A monocot is a ﬂowering plant that initially develops with one leaf.
166A dicot is a ﬂowering plant that initially develops with two leaves.
167Plant Genetic Systems, 315 F.3d at 1338.
168Id. at 1340.
169Id. at 1340 (citing In re Fisher, 447 F.2d 833, 839 (CCPA 1970)).
170Id.
171In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595 (CCPA 1977).
31a solid polymer of propylene.172 Nine years after the patent application was ﬁled, a method was discovered
to produce amorphous polymers.173 The court in Plant Genetic Systems explained that Hogan stood for
the proposition that “the claims (albeit with a narrower scope) might be nevertheless enabled in view of the
state of the art [at the time of ﬁling.]”174 However, the Federal Circuit made clear that the facts at issue in
Plant Genetic Systems were quite diﬀerent from those in Hogan:
We do not read Hogan as allowing an inventor to claim what was speciﬁcally desired but diﬃcult to
obtain at the time the application was ﬁled, unless the patent discloses how to make and use it. In
Hogan, amorphous propylene, on the record before the court, was not known or in existence when the
application was ﬁled. In the present case, however, monocots existed [at the time the applications
was ﬁled] and stably-transformed monocot cells were highly desirable...Thus, monocots and stably
transformed monocot cells were not an unknown concept that came into existence only after [the
date of ﬁling].175
The Federal Circuit aﬃrmed the district court’s ﬁnding that the claims at issue were invalid for lack of
enablement. Arguably, the court imposed a reasonable foreseeability standard when assessing the enablement
requirement.176 The court is likely to ﬁnd claims invalid for lack of enablement when at the time of ﬁling it
is foreseeable that an improvement to an invention could have been made, but there is no disclosure in the
application about how to achieve that improvement.177
The Federal Circuit’s most recent decision addressing the written description and enablement requirements
is Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc.178 This case involved monoclonal antibody technology, speciﬁcally,
a “monoclonal antibody that binds to human c-erbB-2 antigen.”179 An antibody is a protein molecule
generated by the immune system that is capable of recognizing and binding to a very speciﬁc antigen. The
172Id.
173Id.
174Id.
176Brian v. Slater & Lucian C. Chen, Enablement in the Spotlight: Federal Circuit Applied Foreseeability Standard for Biotech
Patents, Which will Likely Restrict Broad Claims, 25 Nat’l L.J. S1, Col. 2 (June 16, 2003).
177Id.
178Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., Nos. 03-1158, 03-1159, 2004 WL 612854 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 30, 2004).
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32antigen in this case, c-erbB-2 (or HER2) is associated with breast cancer cells. The court determined that the
patent claims covering the antibody were invalid for failure to meet the written description and enablement
requirements.
Murine antibodies are antibodies derived from mouse cells that have been produced using hybridoma tech-
nology. Chimeric and humanized antibodies, on the other hand, are produced using recombinant DNA
techniques; both are derived from the DNA of more than one species, but humanized antibodies are de-
rived primarily from human DNA. Chimeric and humanized antibodies have many advantages over murine
antibodies, including reducing the likelihood of a deleterious immune response and activating beneﬁcial
secondary human immune responses.180
In Chiron v. Genentech, the patent in dispute claimed priority based on applications ﬁled in 1984, 1985, and
1986. The 1984 application disclosed a murine antibody, known as 454C11, which was capable of binding to
the antigen HER2. However, the application did not identify the structure, function, or molecular weight
of the antigen. The application also did not disclose any chimeric or humanized antibodies. In fact, the
ﬁrst publication disclosing chimeric antibodies did not appear until four months after the 1984 ﬁling date,
and the ﬁrst publication disclosing humanized antibodies did not appear until two years after the 1984 ﬁling
date.
The 1985 and 1986 applications each disclosed six additional monoclonal antibodies that bind to HER2 and
both applications provided an approximate molecular weight of the antigen. However, neither application
described the identity, structure, or function of the antigen, and neither application disclosed any information
180Id.
33about chimeric or humanized antibodies. The two applications deﬁned the term “monoclonal antibody” as
“an antibody composition having a homogenous antibody population. It is not intended to be limited as
regards the source of the antibody or the manner in which it is made.”181
With respect to the 1984 application, the court noted that because the ﬁrst mention of chimeric antibody
technology appeared in the literature after the ﬁling date of the application, chimeric antibody technology
was by deﬁnition “outside the bounds of the enablement requirement.”182 Thus, the inventors were under
no obligation to enable the nonexistent technology of chimeric antibodies. However, Chiron could not
claim priority based on the 1984 application because the application failed to satisfy the written description
requirement.183 The court found that the “Chiron scientists, by deﬁnition, could not have possession of,
and disclose, the subject matter of chimeric antibodies that did not even exist at the time of the 1984
application.”184
With respect to the 1985 and 1986 applications, the court determined that at the time of their ﬁlings,
chimeric antibodies could appropriately be characterized as a “nascent technology.” Evidence suggested
that in 1985 and 1986 it was a diﬃcult and unpredictable process to produce chimeric antibodies and that
most laboratories did not have the necessary equipment. Thus, because “undue experimentation” would
have been required in order to produce chimeric antibodies based on the provided disclosure, the district
court appropriately concluded that Chiron could not claim priority based on the 1985 and 1986 applications
because the applications failed to satisfy the enablement requirement.
181Id at *3.
182Id at *5 (citing Hogan).
183Id at *6. The court explained that:
The written description requirement prevents applicants from using the amendment process to update their disclosures (claims
or speciﬁcations) during their pendancy before the patent oﬃce. Otherwise applicants could add new matter to their disclosures
and date them back to their original ﬁling date, thus defeating an accurate accounting of the priority of invention.
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34In a thoughtful concurring opinion, Judge Bryson addressed the important interaction between the en-
ablement requirement and claim construction. Judge Bryson agreed that as the claims were construed in
Genentech v. Chiron, the 1984 application failed to satisfy the written description requirement, and thus
that the patentee was not entitled to the priority date of the 1984 application. However, Judge Bryson
believed that the law of enablement, as stated in Plant Genetic Systems, meant that a later-existing state of
the art could not be used to invalidate a patent that met the enablement requirement at the time of ﬁling.
Thus, in Genentech v. Chiron, the later-developed chimeric antibody technology should not have been used
to determine that the 1984 application failed to meet the enablement requirement. Instead, the claims of
the Chiron patent should have been construed, if possible, not to reach the undeveloped chimeric antibody
technology:
I think that the proper approach, suggested in the concurring opinion in Hogan and in Plant Genetic
Systems, is to address cases of new technology by construing claims, where possible, as they would
have been understood by one of skill in the art at the time of the invention, and not construing
them to reach the as-yet-undeveloped technology that the applicant did not enable. That approach
preserves the beneﬁts of patent protection for the invention that the applicant has actually conceived
and enabled, without extending those beneﬁts for an invention that the applicant may not have
conceived and certainly has not enabled.185
While patentees would like the best of both worlds: broad claim coverage and the earliest possible priority
date; the broader the claim language the less likely the patent is to meet the enablement requirement. This
is, of course, because the scope of enablement must be commensurate with the scope of the claims. In
addition, in an area such as biotechnology, where science is rapidly advancing, patentees often attempt to
secure broad claims that cover technology appearing only after the date of ﬁling. Under the Plant Genetic
Systems approach, these broad claims would still be enabled as long as the claims were construed to cover
technology that was as of yet undiscovered at the time that the patent application was ﬁled. However, as in
Chiron v. Genentech, these broad claims will often be held invalid for failure to meet the written description
35requirement. Judge Bryson’s suggested approach would ensure that the patentee’s claims (although more
narrowly construed) would be more likely to meet the written description requirement and thus be upheld
as valid.
The requirements of written description and enablement have caused more controversy in the biopharma-
ceutical community in recent years than have any of the other requirements for patentability. Many have
hailed the heightened written description requirement set forth in the Eli Lilly line of cases as critical in
order to protect incentives for innovation in the biotechnology industry. Steven Caltrider and James Kelly,
members of the patent division at Eli Lilly and Company, have stated:
Patents that extend beyond their contributions inhibit subsequent innovators from entering the
ﬁeld. They also provide a disincentive for investments in downstream innovation and exacerbate the
problem of stacking royalties. If the Lilly doctrine declines, biotechnology inventors would race to
the patent oﬃce with nothing more than a stated function and a research plan. Alleged inventors
would ﬁle patent applications before they had made their inventions and before they could describe
them. This would frustrate the essential policy objective of the patent law “to promote the disclosure
of inventions, not of research plans.”186
Others have criticized the Federal Circuit’s general approach to treating DNA-based technology as a subset
of chemistry, as being “misconceived.187 Art Rai, for example, has argued that the Federal Circuit is well
behind the technology in acknowledging the information containing nature of genetic sequences.188 This
argument implies that there may be less of a need for heightened disclosure requirements in the area of
biotechnology because the ﬁeld is really not as unpredictable as the Federal Circuit makes it out to be.
187Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology, 34 Wake Forest L. Rev. 827,
835-36 (1999).
188Id.
36IV.
37Economics of Patents
Traditional thinking about the economics of patents provides four main justiﬁcations for the patent system:
1) incentive to invent, 2) incentive to disclose, 3) incentive to commercialize, and 4) incentive to design
around.189 Standard theory relies on the special characteristics of information and the resulting diﬃculty in
enforcing property rights. Three notable characteristics of information are its non-appropriability, its non-
excludability, and its non-rivalry.190 Information is non-appropriable because the producer cannot sell it for
its full value; once the producer discloses the information to a buyer, the buyer can then re-sell the infor-
mation for only a fraction of the cost (the cost of transmission).191 Likewise, information is non-excludable
because it is very costly to prevent the transmission of information to those not purchasing from the original
producer.192 Finally, information is non-rivalrous because the value of the information to others is generally
not decreased depending on how many other people use it.193
Through the patent system, the government intervenes in the market to create property rights in information
and thus to provide an incentive for invention. Based on the characteristics of information explained above,
economic theory suggests that some form of market regulation is necessary in order to avoid an underproduc-
tion of works embodying ideas.194 Since a patent provides an exclusive right to one’s invention, the patentee
is able to secure monopoly proﬁts on the invention for the length of the patent and can appropriate more
of the economic value of the invention. Thus, traditional thinking about patents is that stronger patent
189See Chisum, supra note 112, at 70-76.
190Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics, 126 (3d. ed. 2000).
191Id. In addition, it is diﬃcult for buyers to determine the value of information until they have access to it—at which point
they are no longer willing to pay for it. Id.
192Id. While this characteristic of information ensures that information will be optimally utilized, it provides no incentive for
investment in research. See W. Kip Viscusi, et al, Economics of Regulation and Antitrust 800 (3d. ed. 2000).
193Cooter, supra note 190, at 126.
194Id. Two alternative forms of government intervention are the state supply of information (such as weather forecasts) and
public subsidies for the private provision of information (such as government funding of scientiﬁc research by private universities).
Id.
38protection will induce more investment in research and development.195 Of course, when the patentee prices
products higher than marginal cost, this will mean that fewer consumers will be able to aﬀord to purchase
the product than under a more competitive system. This “deadweight loss” imposes costs on the public.
Consequently, the patent system can be justiﬁed only if the beneﬁts it produces in terms of innovation out-
weigh the costs to society.196
While the empirical evidence supporting the “reward theory” has been mixed, it has often been shown that
in the pharmaceutical industry patents are an eﬀective means of appropriating returns on investment in
research.197 This is due, in part, to the fact that in addition to preventing duplication, patents in the phar-
maceutical industry have been eﬀective in securing royalty income.198 Of great importance, many small and
medium sized biotechnology ﬁrms would not be able to exist without the prospect of patent protection.199
Patents are often a small ﬁrm’s most valuable asset and enable the ﬁrm to attract investment capital.200
A second traditional justiﬁcation for the patent system is that patents will induce the patentee to disclose
valuable information to the public. At the most basic level, once the term of the patent expires, the invention
can be practiced freely by the public and the beneﬁts can become widespread. In addition, when a patent
issues, the contents of the document become available to the public. Thus, the public has immediate access
to information about the underlying technology and the public may be alerted to additional uses of the
invention not foreseen by the patentee.201 The patent system also ensures that the patentee does not have
to expend valuable resources to keep the invention a trade secret.202 The greater security and decreased
195Nancy T. Gallini, The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent Reform, 16 J. of Economic Perspectives
131 (2002).
196Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 989, 997-97 (1997).
197Richard C. Levin, et al, Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 1987 Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity 783, 795-96 (1987).
198Id at 799.
199Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, The Beneﬁts and Costs of Strong Patent Protection: A Contribution to the
Current Debate, 27 Research Policy 273 (1998).
200See id. at 276. See also Levin, supra note 197 at 797.
201Mazzoleni, supra note 199, at 278.
202William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law 328 (2003).
39cost of licensing a patent as opposed to a trade secret allows for eﬃciency in manufacturing.203 This ability
to license inventions at low risk and low cost is especially important for small ﬁrms that are often unable to
aﬀord to develop and manufacture commercial products based on their inventions.
A third traditional justiﬁcation for the patent system is that it provides an incentive for ﬁrms to commer-
cialize products. Often, large investments must be made between the time that a patent is granted on
an invention and the time that a marketable product is developed. This is especially true in the case of
pharmaceutical products. More than 99.9% of drugs do not make it past preclinical testing or clinical trials,
and the current cost of bringing a drug to market is estimated at $800 million.204 Small ﬁrms, which often
play an invaluable role in early drug discovery, rely on patents in order to obtain ﬁnancing to develop drug
products.205 This is because larger companies are unlikely to invest huge sums of money to develop a product
unless they can secure monopoly proﬁts to recoup their losses (at least in the case of the drugs that succeed
and make it to market). In addition, in some cases it may be necessary for the original inventor to secure
some of the rewards of later commercial development in order for the invention to occur in the ﬁrst place.206
A fourth traditional justiﬁcation for the patent system is that it provides an incentive to design around
inventions. Often, the full beneﬁts of an invention are only realized when competitors are able to imitate
and improve the invention.207 A common strategy in the pharmaceutical industry, known as “molecular
modiﬁcation,” involves development of a chemical compound distinct from the patented invention but which
performs a similar function.208 While this practice is “arguably wasteful,” it may result in the development
of products without some of the deleterious side eﬀects of the original drug.209
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40A.
Prospect Theory
Introduced by Edmund Kitch, the “prospect theory” oﬀers an alternative conception of the way in which
the patent system functions.210 This theory recognizes that in the process of technological innovation, there
are many diﬀerent prospects, “each with [their] own associated sets of probabilities of costs and returns.”211
Each technological prospect can be pursued by a number of diﬀerent ﬁrms, because often “when technological
developments bring something into the realm of the possible, it may be known to many and many may
search.”212 These diﬀerent ﬁrms may use varying levels of resources and their activities may not be disclosed
to each other.213 Thus, this process can only be undertaken eﬃciently if a system is put in place that assures:
eﬃcient allocation of the resources among the prospects at an eﬃcient rate and in an eﬃcient amount;
if management of each prospect is in the hands of the entity best equipped to manage it; and if
information found by one entity is communicated to other ﬁrms at an eﬃcient rate.214
The patent system often functions in this manner by issuing patents for inventions long before a commercial
product is developed.215 Early grants of patents ensure eﬃcient allocation of resources and investment in
product development. 216 Even if the original inventor does not conduct additional research and development
himself, no other parties are likely to invest signiﬁcantly without ﬁrst licensing the patent from the original
inventor.217
210Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J. of Law and Economics 265 (1977).
211Id. at 266.
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213Id. at 276 (noting that “subsequent investigation of the same prospect by other ﬁrms can neither build on the knowledge
obtained by the ﬁrst searcher not determine the eﬃcient level and strategy of search based upon his failure”).
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41Thus, the patent system enables ﬁrms to signal each other and helps to prevent duplicative search eﬀorts.218
Since patenting of an invention often occurs early on in the road to commercial development of a product,
disclosure of the invention also occurs at this stage. Disclosure functions diﬀerently under the prospect
theory:
The prospect creates an incentive in the owner to eﬃciently disseminate information about the
invention himself. He will do this directly, not through the bulky mechanism of a formal patent
description. The purpose of the description in the patent is not to disclose the commercially relevant
technology, but to provide a context in which the legal limits of the claim acquire meaning...The
eﬀect of [eﬀorts to increase the amount of disclosure in patent documents] is to raise the cost
and complexity of patents without increasing the amount of commercially meaningful information
disseminated.219
Therefore, under the prospect theory, a detailed disclosure of the invention is not necessary because the
inventor can be relied on to disclose information about the invention in the most eﬃcient way during product
development.
Many commentators have expressed concerns about the prospect theory as a justiﬁcation for the patent
system. While the prospect theory may work well when there is only one important commercial product
that can be developed as a result of each patented invention, in the case of biotechnology there are often
many diﬀerent treatments and innovations that may result from the initial patented invention, and a single
entity might be interested in pursuing only a select few.220 In addition, a single entity supervising research
and development projects might easily overlook diﬀerent avenues of research that would be pursued by a
larger number of independent inventors.221
218Id. at 278.
220See Viscusi, supra note 192, at 813.
221Id. See also Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 839
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42B. Narrow v. Broad Patents
The breadth of the property rights granted by the patent system has important implications for innovation.
Under the “reward theory,” strong, broad patent grants may be necessary in order to allow inventors to
appropriate returns on fundamental research; this is especially the case if the fundamental research has little
“stand alone value.”222 A broad patent allows the original inventor to receive some of the value of later
commercial applications and thus encourages more fundamental research.223 Similarly, under the “prospect
theory,” early issuance of broad patents ensures that the commercial development process will proceed
eﬃciently.
In addition to those criticisms of the prospect theory already articulated, broad patent grants may give rise
to two more problems. First, ﬁrms may be deterred from engaging in research “in the neighborhood” of
the patented invention, and second, they may be deterred from searching for improvements in the patented
invention.224 A signiﬁcant improvement on an original invention may be patented, as long as the improvement
meets all of the requirements for patentability.225 However, the situation of “blocking” patents arises when
the owner of the improvement patent cannot practice his invention without infringing the original patent, and
the original patent owner cannot practice the improvement technology without infringing the improvement
patent.226 In a situation of “blocking patents,” both parties must enter into a licensing agreement in order for
either party to be able to practice the improvement.227 As a consequence, the “more absolute the property
right given to original authors and inventors, the more critical eﬃcient licensing is to subsequent innovation,
222See Cooter, supra note 190, at 132.
223Id. at 131.
224Mazzeloni, supra note 199, at 275. See also Lemley, supra note 196.
225See supra Section III.
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226See Lemley, supra note 196, at 1009-10.
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43and the more sensitive the industry is to market failures in licensing.”228
The optimal breadth of patent scope may also depend on the particular nature of the technology. Merges
and Nelson have suggested that in science-based technologies, such as biotechnology, there is a heightened
danger associated with the award of broad patents.229 A science-based technology is an industry that relies
in large part on published scientiﬁc articles and general scientiﬁc advances; it “straddles the public world
of science and the private world of intellectual property.”230 Often, in a science-based industry, a patent is
issued to the ﬁrst person who can practically apply general scientiﬁc advancements, and there is a danger that
the breadth of the patent will include much work of others and not just the contributions of the particular
inventor.231 The authors suggest that “scope limitations based on close adherence to the inventor’s disclosure
and judicious use of the doctrine of equivalents provide the surest way around this danger.”232
There is reason to believe that overly broad patents in the biotechnology ﬁeld may have greater potential to
impede innovation than in other industries. While “molecular modiﬁcation”233 may be a common practice
in the pharmaceutical industry, it may be much more diﬃcult to “design around” treatments that depend
on a gene sequence: “several applications of a gene, including diagnostics, rely on the use of the precise
sequence of a gene and its mutations.”234
C. Biotechnology and the Patent Thicket
228See Lemley, supra note 196, at 998-99.
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44Many commentators agree that crafting patent law in the area of biotechnology presents unique challenges.
Heller and Eisenberg have suggested that patents can actually deter innovation in the area of biotechnology
due to the “tragedy of the anticommons.”235 As opposed to the more traditional tragedy of the commons
(when too many individuals have access to a common, scarce resource), the tragedy of the anticommons
refers to the following situation:
A tragedy of the anticommons can occur when too many individuals have rights of exclusion in a
scarce resource. The tragedy is that rational individuals, acting separately, may collectively waste
the resource by underconsuming it compared with a social optimum.236
The anticommons situation described above becomes a “tragedy”
because of the transaction costs that must be incurred in order to
negotiate use of the resource.237 The greater the number of people
owning rights of exclusion on a valuable resource, the less likely it
is that the resource will be used in a socially optimal way.238
The tragedy of the anticommons can occur in the area of biomedical research when “too many owners hold
rights in previous discoveries that constitute obstacles to future research.”239 As an example, take the case
of Expressed Sequence Tags (“ESTs”). An EST is a short piece of DNA which corresponds to a fragment of
cDNA and can often be patented as useful tools to search for full-length genes.240 Later, if the full-length
gene is discovered and characterized, it too could be patented as long as it is “novel and nonobvious” (i.e. as
long as the patentee discloses a new use for the full-length gene).241 However, in order to use the full-length
235Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research,
280 Science 698 (1998).
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45gene, the patentee would need to ﬁrst obtain a license from the owner of the EST patent.242 Since a typical
EST is only 400 to 500 nucleotides in length, and a typical gene is 2,000 to 25,000 nucleotides in length,243
many ESTs could been patented on the same gene, making licensing agreements for the use of the gene
fragment potentially diﬃcult.
A similar situation has the potential to arise any time multiple
patents were issued on individual, isolated fragments of the same
gene. Strong, overlapping ownership could make the development
of many downstream commercial products based on the gene se-
quences diﬃcult.244 Notably, protein-based therapies and many
diagnostic tests require the use of multiple gene fragments.245 As-
suming that these gene fragments are all owned separately, then
in order to develop many commercial products it is necessary to
transact with each of the individual patent owners. This process
of transacting is likely to be diﬃcult and costly and could end up
impeding biomedical innovation.
Carl Shapiro has referred to this situation of overlapping licenses that arises as a result of cumulative
innovation and blocking patents as a “patent thicket.”246 Potential strategies for the private sector to
address this patent thicket include cross-licensing and patent pools.247 Cross-licensing is “an agreement
Solution for Expressed Sequence Tags, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 735, 764 (2000). See also John J. Doll, The Patenting of DNA, 280
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246Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting, Innovation, Policy, and
the Economy, Vol. I (2001).
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46between two companies that grants each the right to practice the other’s patents.”248 A patent pool is an
arrangement among multiple patent holders to aggregate their patents, typically making all pooled patents
available to each member of the pool and oﬀering standard licensing terms to licensees who are not members
of the pool.249 However, in addition to the increased transaction costs resulting from coordination, private
companies must also contend with antitrust concerns.250
While it is well accepted today that the “intellectual property laws and the antitrust laws share the common
purpose of promoting innovation and enhancing consumer welfare,”251 patent pools pose unique problems
under antitrust law. The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have issued Antitrust
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (“Antitrust Guidelines”).252 These guidelines explain
that patent pooling agreements may provide pro-competitive beneﬁts in the following ways: 1) integrating
complementary technologies; 2) reducing transaction costs; 3) clearing blocking positions; 4) avoiding costly
infringement litigation; and 5) promoting the dissemination of technology.253
On the other hand, the Antitrust Guidelines make clear that patent-pooling agreements can have anti-
competitive eﬀects if: 1) collective price or output restraints do not contribute to an eﬃciency-enhancing
integration of economic activity among participants; 2) patent pools are mechanisms to accomplish price-
ﬁxing or market division; 3) the eﬀect of a settlement is to diminish competition among entities that would
have been actual or likely potential competitors in a relevant market; 4) excluded ﬁrms cannot eﬀectively
compete in the relevant market for the good incorporating the licensed technologies; or 5) the arrangement
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249Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions: The Case of Patent Pools, in Expanding the
Boundaries of Intellectual Property 123 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).
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47alters or discourages participants from engaging in research.254
Unless a patent pool is challenged as per se illegal (an agreement to ﬁx prices or output, rig bids, or share
or divide markets), the pool will be evaluated under the “rule of reason.”255 Under the “rule of reason”
analysis, the “central question is whether the relevant agreement likely harms competition by increasing the
ability or incentive proﬁtably to raise prices above or reduce output, quality, service, or innovation below
what likely would prevail in the absence of the relevant agreement.256
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has issued a series of business review letters pursuant to DOJ’s Business
Review Procedure, 28 C.F.R. §50.6, which provide some guidance as to how the principles announced in the
Antitrust Guidelines will be applied.257 As summarized by Carl Shapiro, the essence of the DOJ’s approach
is:
Inclusion of truly complementary patents in a patent pool is desirable and pro-competitive, but
assembly of substitute or rival patents in a pool can eliminate competition and lead to elevated
license fees. Put diﬀerently, the key distinction in forming a patent pool is that between ‘blocking’
or ‘essential’ patents, which properly belong in the pool, and ‘substitute’ or ‘rival’ patents, which
may need to remain separate.258
In sum, when evaluating patent pools under the antitrust laws, the DOJ determines: 1) whether the proposed
licensing program is likely to integrate complementary patent rights; and 2) if so, whether the resulting com-
petitive beneﬁts are likely to be outweighed by competitive harm posed by other aspects of the program.259
The Federal Trade Commission has taken a similar approach when evaluating patent pools under the an-
titrust laws.260
254Id.
255Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, Federal Trade Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice,
April 2000.
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257Letter from Joel I. Klein to Gerrard R. Beeney, June 26, 1997 (“MPEG-2 Business Review Letter”); Letter from Joel I.
Klein to Gerrard R. Beeney, December 16, 1998 (“Phillips-Sony-Pioneer DVD Business Review Letter); Letter from Joel I.
Klein to Ky P. Ewing, November 12, 2002 (“3G Partnership Business Review Letter”).
259Letter from Joel I. Klein to Ky P. Ewing, Nov. 12, 2002 (“3G Partnership Business Review Letter”).
260See Aug. 21, 1998 Press Release, Summit and VISX Settle FTC Charges of Violating Antitrust Laws,
http:www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/08/sumvisx.htm.
48While patent pools may help to alleviate patent thicket problems, few patent-pooling agreements have arisen
thus far in the biotechnology sector. Despite the potential for beneﬁt, patent-pooling agreements may be
less likely to arise in the biotechnology industry as opposed to other sectors. Heller & Eisenberg note that
“because patents matter more to the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries than to other industries,
ﬁrms in these industries may be less willing to participate in patent pools that undermine the gains from
exclusivity. Moreover, the lack of substitutes for certain biomedical discoveries (such as patented genes
or receptors) may increase the leverage of some patent holders, thereby aggravating holdout problems.”261
Finally, Arti Rai has argued that patent pools are less likely to arise in the biotechnology industry because
of the great number of heterogeneous parties with contradictory interests that would have to come to an
agreement.262
There are some signals that the biotechnology industry may be more receptive to patent pools in the future.
Lawrence Sung explains the ways in which the structure of the industry seems to be changing:
If you looked at the past ﬁve to even ten years of development in the biotechnology sector, the
base model ﬁve or ten years ago was to have the big pharma-company essentially buy up all the
little pharmaceutical, little biotechnology startups that were on the market and that way clear their
product development cycles. Increasingly, the biotechnology sector is moving very much like other
sectors into having a lot of diﬀerent startups who are not willing to simply be purchased outright,
but are looking for a longer range or at least intermediate range business cycle of their own, which
is to retool and say, we are no longer, for example, just a genomics company; we too want to get
into the drug discovery market. And that is going to change the scope of the biotechnology sector
ultimately and bring it I think more in line with how we see other sectors developing also.263
In addition to Sung, many other academics and commentators have suggested that the economic and social
beneﬁts of patent pools outweigh their costs in the biotechnology sector.264 Finally, the USPTO has issued
261Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 235.
262See Rai, supra note 187, at 840-41.
264See e.g., David B. Resnik, A Biotechnology Patent Pool: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, J. of Philosophy of Science
& Law, Vol.3, Jan. 2003; Katherine Moore, Sharing Genetic Research Tools—The Ethical Considerations, Endocrine Society
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49a white paper addressing patent pools in the area of biotechnology. This paper suggests that the beneﬁts
of patent pooling include: 1) the elimination of problems caused by “blocking” patents; 2) reduction of
licensing transaction costs; 3) reduction in litigation costs; 4) distribution of costs; and 5) institutionalized
exchange of technical information not covered by patents.265
V.
265Jeanne Clark et al., Patent Pools: A Solution to the Problem of Access in Biotechnology Patents, Working Paper, U.S.
Department of Commerce, U.S. Patent and Trademark Oﬃce, 2000.
50Biopharmaceuticals: the Patent System and Incentives for Innovation
A. Small Biotechnology Firms: An Argument for Strong Patent Protection
The pharmaceutical industry spent an estimated $33 billion on research and development in 2003.266 In an
additional attempt to increase productivity, pharmaceutical companies have engaged in waves of mergers.
For example, there were 100 company mergers in the year 1996.267 However, despite this large investment
and these vast structural changes, the number of drugs per unit of research and development spending is
thought to be decreasing each year.268 To make matters worse, the average cost of bringing a new drug to
market is now estimated at close to $800 million.269 Kenneth Kaitin, director of the Tufts Center for the
Study of Drug Development has stated in reference to the current situation in the pharmaceutical industry:
“This is not sustainable...It’s going to force a complete restructuring of the industry.”270
As previously noted, one proposed solution to the problem is a greater reliance on small biotechnology
companies.271 The reasoning is as follows: it is incredibly diﬃcult to predict which drugs (given the 99.9%
of drugs that fail either preclinical testing or clinical trials) will be winners.272 Smaller biotechnology
companies should be relied on for fundamental research and early drug discovery, and then once a favorable
prospect is discovered, the ﬁrms can turn to larger pharmaceutical companies to develop the drug and help
it to clear the expensive and multiple regulatory hurdles on the way to market.273
However, in order for small biotechnology ﬁrms to innovate, they are in desperate need of strong patent
266Robert F. Service, Surviving the Blockbuster Syndrome, 303 Science 1796 (2004) (citing the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America).
267Id.
268Id.
269Bigger Isn’t Always Better, 418 Nature 353 (2002).
270Service, supra note 266.
271Bigger Isn’t Always Better, supra note 269.
272Id.
273Id.
51protection in order to attract ﬁnancing.274 As Mark Lemley notes:
If you ask venture capitalists what they think of patents, and in particular, of patent litigation,
they’ll tell you it’s awful. “This is a terrible thing; leave us alone and let us innovate,” they will say.
And if you ask them how their companies are doing in the marketplace, they will answer you with
reference to patents: “our company has patented this model”; “our company got twelve patents this
year”; “our company has patent applications that cover this, that, and the other thing.” Venture
capitalists love patents in this form.275
Lemley argues that a possible explanation for the demonstrated link between venture capital and ﬁnancing
is that “people are patenting at a very early stage in the process...precisely in order to attract or appease
venture capital.”276
In sum, strong patent protection is a necessary prerequisite to promoting innovation at the level of the
small biotechnology ﬁrms. First, strong patent protection allows these ﬁrms to attract ﬁnancing and venture
capital. Second, strong patent protection allows small ﬁrms greater leverage in licensing negotiations with
large pharmaceutical companies.277 If Lawrence Sung’s predictions are correct, then many biotechnology
ﬁrms may be working to achieve intermediate business cycles of their own instead of simply being bought
out by larger companies.278 These small ﬁrms will therefore be interested in licensing their technology to
larger pharmaceutical companies who are better equipped to work on commercial product development and
drug marketing. Strong patent protection will favor the smaller ﬁrms in these licensing negotiations, and
will thus give smaller ﬁrms greater incentive to engage in fundamental research in the ﬁrst place.
274Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 137 (2000). See also
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52B.
Patenting New Technology: Proteomics
As described earlier, the biotechnology industry is increasingly turning to proteomics to identify new targets
for drug therapy. Since defective proteins are often the culprits leading to disease, protein-based drug
therapies oﬀer great promise.
Commentators have noted that “there is not likely to be a single technology that will dominate the [ﬁeld
of proteomics]—as robotic gene sequencers did for genomics—not a single corporate juggernaut like Celera
Genomics of Rockville, Maryland. That’s because unlike genes, proteins vary widely in their chemical
behaviors, making it diﬃcult to come up with one technique that works equally well on all proteins.”279
Indeed, advancements in proteomics to date have been hit or miss, and many ﬁrms have been forced to
adopt the strategy of focusing on one speciﬁc avenue of research.280 This focused approach came about as
a result, in part, of the expense of patenting early stage discoveries in proteomics. The cost of patenting an
invention worldwide can run as high as a couple of hundreds of thousands of dollars.281 Thus, it is simply
too expensive for most companies to engage in large-scale patenting of proteomics discoveries, given that
most discovered proteins can only be used as a diagnostic tool, not as more-proﬁtable drug targets.282
The complex and diﬃcult nature of proteomics research will make the contribution of small biotechnology
ﬁrms even more important. In addition, the development of patent protection for the resulting discoveries
will have serious implications for innovation in the industry. While patenting proteins is not in and of
279See Service, supra note 21.
280David Cyranoski, This Protein Belongs To..., 426 Nature 10 (2003).
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53itself anything new, the practice is likely to come under heightened scrutiny and to be of ever-increasing
importance to the biotechnology industry. One important issue is how broadly the Federal Circuit should
interpret patent claims covering proteins.
Patent law will need to address the important connection between patents on genes and patents on the
corresponding proteins. While there are approximately only 35,000 protein-encoding genes, there are as
many as 2 million proteins in any given individual.283 It is now known that the same gene can be used to
produce many diﬀerent proteins, due to post-transcriptional and post-translational modiﬁcations.284 After
the transcription of a DNA sequence into an mRNA sequence, the mRNA transcript can be “spliced”285 by
cell machinery to produce many diﬀerent proteins.286 In addition, other modiﬁcations can be made by cell
machinery after the mRNA transcript is translated into an amino acid sequence and a protein is formed.
These modiﬁcations include the attachment of new chemical groups to the protein that can cause a change
in function.287
At the time most gene patents issued, their claims covered only the single protein for which the gene was
thought to encode.288 Theoretically, these DNA claims could be interpreted broadly to cover the production
of any protein encoded by a given DNA sequence.289 However, this is very unlikely to happen. According
to John Doll, head of the USPTO biotechnology art unit, as long as a given protein variant meets the
requirements for patentability, including novelty and nonobviousness, it can still be patented even if a patent
283See Robert F. Service, Gene and Protein Patents Get Ready to Go Head to Head, 294 Science 2082 (2001).
284See Thomas, supra note 234, at 1188.
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54has already issued for the gene sequence encoding the protein (or for another version of the protein.)290
Of course, assuming that production of the new protein variant, or any resulting treatments or commercial
products, requires use of the gene sequence, a company will still be forced to pay royalties to owner of the
gene patent.
The case of Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Rouessel, Inc. provides some insight into how the Federal Circuit
views the written description requirement when it comes to protein technology. Generally, recombinant
protein techniques are not considered to be new or unknown techniques that those of skill in the art are
likely to miscomprehend. Thus, it will be relatively easy for broad claims covering recombinant methods
of protein production to meet the written description requirement. In Amgen, a rival company was found
to have infringed Amgen’s patent by producing a slightly diﬀerent variant of EPO protein via recombinant
techniques using host human cells (whereas Amgen’s patent claims were construed to cover the recombinant
production of EPO in a broad class of mammalian cells). Some commentators have criticized the Federal
Circuit’s ruling in Amgen as construing protein claims too broadly. Robert Cook-Deegan, Director of the
Center for Genome Ethics, Law, and Policy at Duke University, has argued that the case could “discourage
companies from trying to make better version of protein-based drugs.”291
In addition, as the University of Rochester v. Searle makes clear, “reach through” claims relating to proteins
are likely to be held invalid under the written description requirement. For example, a patentee could not
claim a method of treatment consisting of using a compound to inhibit or stimulate production of a particular
protein and a method of screening for such compounds, without identifying the compound or explaining how
it might be obtained.
290See Service, supra note 283.
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55A second issue that patent law will need to address is the how to handle claims directed to proteins based
on 3-D structural analysis. In addition to claims directed to proteins, it is likely that claims will also be
made to computerized data storage mediums, to computerized screening methods for identifying compounds
that bind to the protein and are useful in therapeutic treatments, and to the compounds that are identiﬁed
through this process.
In 2002, the USPTO, European Patent Oﬃce, and Japan Patent Oﬃce met in Austria to discuss the
patentability of protein 3-D structure related claims. The meeting produced a report on a comparative
study of patenting practices at the three oﬃces.292 The report attempted to address four main issues: 1)
what types of claims are eligible subject matter; 2) what types of claims satisfy the utility requirements;
3) what types of claims satisfy the enablement and written description requirements; and 4) what types of
claims satisfy the novelty and nonobviousness requirements.293
With respect to claims covering a protein deﬁned by structural coordinates, the USPTO comments explain
that the protein would meet the utility requirement if the application discloses a speciﬁc therapeutic use for
the protein such as lowering blood pressure. Of course, based on Federal Circuit precedent, the application
would also have to present credible evidence of pharmacological activity based on in vitro or in vivo test
results or based on structural homology. In addition, the claims to the protein would likely meet the
novelty requirement assuming that another protein is not present in the prior art having the same speciﬁc
function and approximately the same molecular weight. Finally, the claims to the protein would likely meet
the written description and enablement requirements if the speciﬁcation discloses the 3-D structure of the
protein including the coordinates, of the amino acid side chains, the source organism for the protein, and
292See European Patent Oﬃce, Japan Patent Oﬃce, and United States Patent Oﬃce, Trilateral Project WM4: Comparative
Studies in New Technologies (biotechnology, business methods, etc.), Report on Comparative Study on 3-dimensional (3-D)
Structure Related Claims, Vienna, Austria, Nov. 4-8, 2002.
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56the molecular weight of the protein.
Both a computer model of a protein or a data array comprising the atomic coordination of a protein would be
considered merely descriptive material or a mere arrangement of data and therefore not patentable subject
matter under §101.
With respect to computerized screening programs used to identify proteins and therapeutically useful com-
pounds that bind to the protein, the USPTO comments suggest that a screening method would qualify as
patentable subject matter as long as it produces a “useful, concrete, and tangible result.”294 A computerized
screening method would meet the requirements of patentable subject matter when the program provides a
result set that includes a number of lead compounds with an increased probability of binding to a protein
whose structure was input. The utility of the screening method would depend on the utility of the candidate
compounds; for example, the compounds might be useful for the stimulation or inhibition of a protein that
would result in a treatment for a speciﬁc disease. However, in order to establish a substantial and credible
utility, there must also be evidence of a correlation between the binding of the compound and either activa-
tion or inhibition of the protein. Whether the application meets the enablement requirement would depend
on the amount and nature of experimentation required to determine which of the candidate compounds
would be useful—i.e. the binding identiﬁcation programs would have to be shown to be highly predictive.
In order for the application to meet the written description requirement, the speciﬁcation would have to
describe the structural coordinates of the protein which are required by the screening program. Novelty of
the screening method will depend on whether the 3-D coordinates of the protein required by the screening
program are found in the prior art. Finally, obviousness of the screening method will depend on whether
the computer algorithm used to identify the compounds is obvious based on the prior art. Merely inputting
294State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
57new 3-D protein coordinates into the same computer system is not enough to render the screening system
nonobvious.
Finally, with respect to any compounds identiﬁed by using a computerized screening method, the USPTO
comments suggested that the written description requirement will not be met without identiﬁcation of spe-
ciﬁc structural or functional characteristics of the compound. The enablement requirement would likely
not be met; since the art of computerized screening for protein binding compounds is considered to be
unpredictable, undue experimentation would be necessary in order to identify the desired compounds. In
sum, “patents will not be granted if the experimental data for compounds are predicted only by computer
analysis. Inventions described with in vivo or in vitro experimental results together with protein structural
information or pharmacophores would most likely be as eﬀective as a patent strategy.”295
Federal Circuit precedent and UPSTO guidelines attempt to strike a balance between the beneﬁts of the
patent system in terms of increased innovation and the costs imposed on the public stemming from monopoly
prices during the term of the patent. While strong patent protection is of vital importance to ensuring inno-
vation in the ﬁeld of biotechnology and biopharmaceuticals, it is of equal importance that the requirements
of patentability, especially written description and enablement, be applied strictly. When there is a great
deal of unpredictability in a given art, patents should only be granted to the extent that the inventor has
actually made a contribution in the ﬁeld. This will ensure that there are appropriate incentives for down-
stream research and development, and in the long run will ensure that patents actually promote, rather than
impede, innovation.
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